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From Behind Closed Doors to the Campaign Trail: 
Race and Immigration in British Party Politics, 1945-1965 
 
Nicole M. Chiarodo 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Colored immigration from the New Commonwealth became a highly discussed 
issue in British party politics immediately following the Second World War, but in an 
effort to sustain Great Britain’s imperial status, to portray the nation as a new enlightened 
force, and in reaction to the race issues taking hold in the American South, political elites 
moved to keep their debates concealed from the public.  In this thesis, I investigate the 
positions of Labour and Conservative governments and the circumstances surrounding 
the emergence of race and immigration into the public sphere. Moreover, I examine the 
effects of its arrival. While the introduction of the British Nationality Act in 1948 by the 
Labour government might suggest a progressive and tolerant party focused on equality 
between all British subjects, and the restrictive legislation of 1962 indicates a 
Conservative party focused on restrictive, racist policies, thorough examination of the 
debates between the political elite and a clear understanding of the current state of affairs 
offers a different story.  Immediate postwar policies were formed in the interest of 
shoring up empire, but as Britain began to move closer to Europe, realizing great power 
status might be beyond its capabilities, the importance of empire waned. Resultant 
discussions of restricting entry into Britain and increased racial tensions moved the 
 ii
 iii
debates from behind closed doors and into the public gaze.  Party positions on the 
immigration became evident in the 1964 general election. The issue once relegated to 
private discussions between the political elite could now win or lose an election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1964 General Election in the small West Midlands town of Smethwick, 
Shadow Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker was unseated by a young Conservative 
school teacher by the name of Peter Griffiths.  The fact that the Labour MP of almost 
twenty years had been defeated in a year when national elections swung towards Labour 
was only part of the story; it was the openly racist campaign led by Griffiths that grasped 
the attention of party leaders and constituents alike.  The issue was not the Conservative 
school teacher’s position on immigration, but rather that it was used as his election 
platform, thus discussed openly and, for the first time, made a prominent part of a general 
election.   
Politicians had been debating colored immigration since the end of the Second 
World War, but in a bipartisan effort to sustain Great Britain’s imperial status, to portray 
the nation as a new enlightened force, and in reaction to the race issues taking hold in the 
American South, political elites moved to keep their debates concealed from the public.  
With the British electorate becoming more aware of incidents abroad and increased racial 
tensions at home, the issue had slowly been boiling over into the public gaze, but with 
Griffith’s win against the incumbent it became suddenly clear that taking a stance on 
immigration could be a vote getter- or loser. 
 1
Race had long been an issue in the British Empire. Fueled by commerce and 
justified by Christianity and a civilizing mission, at its height British rule spread across a 
quarter of the globe, presiding over one fifth of its diverse population. The nature of such 
rule was adapted to local conditions; possessions were governed differently based on 
their perceived capability for self-rule.  Where the majority population was white, or 
where the minority of white inhabitants were economically dominant, policies favored 
progress towards self-government. For instance, the Gold Coast of Africa was under 
authoritarian rule by British officials while Canada exercised the right to self-government 
in all but foreign policy.1 As the duke of Newcastle noted, responsible government was 
“only applicable to colonists of the English race.”2 Deemed uncivilized, colored people 
were determined unprepared or even incapable of self-government and in need of British 
guidance.  With little to no regard for native culture and customs, Christian missionaries 
believed it their humanitarian duty to spread European civilization and modernization to 
those considered to be lesser peoples. 
The racial attitudes that dictated rule abroad were duplicated back home. Britain 
has always been a multi-cultural society, albeit the nineteenth-century cultures were 
predicated mainly on class.  With great disparity in British society, members of different 
classes found little common ground.  Gentlemen and manufactures, stockholders and 
factory hands had little to not contact with one another.  But as different as Britain’s 
classes were, they did share a common understanding of the superiority of British 
                                                 
1 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 (New York: Times 
Books, 1978), 20. 
2 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, 151 (1858) in Porter, The Lion’s Share, 29. 
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civilization.3 Bernard Porter argued that the arrogant belief that all peoples should 
advance and be measured according to the British yardstick is based not on their 
prejudices against these peoples, but rather on their understanding of their own nation’s 
evolution.4 British history dictated progress from savagery to civilization which the 
middle classes applied to other cultures in order to explain their differences.5  This shared 
understanding of cultural supremacy was used to bind British society, as racial identity 
served as a common denominator amongst British elites and working class alike, 
providing a connection without need for reordering society.  Their identity as Anglo-
Saxons constructed to differentiate the English from the rest of Europe was now used to 
separate them from the colonial ‘Other.’6  Thus, the idea that the British white man was 
superior to the colored colonial bound British society together.  The agricultural worker 
may be inferior to the international banker, but he ranked above the native simply by 
virtue of his Anglo-Saxon heritage, or Britishness.     
Linda Colley suggests that British national identity was an invention forged 
mainly by war.  In repeated conflict with France from 1689 to 1815, Britons were forced 
to confront an obviously hostile ‘Other’ against which they formed a collective identity.7 
As Peter Sahlins wrote, national identity “like ethnic or communal identity, is contingent 
and relational: it is defined by the social or territorial boundaries drawn to distinguish the 
collective self and to implicit negation, the other.’8 In short, we define ourselves by 
whom or what we are not.  First defining themselves as Protestants struggling for survival 
                                                 
3 Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 22. 
4 Ibid., 79. 
5 Ibid., 113. 
6 Ibid., 207. 
7 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (London: Pimlico, 2003), 6. 
8 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
1989): 271 in Colley, Britons, 7. 
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against a Catholic power, Britons later defined themselves “in contrast to the colonial 
peoples they conquered, people who were manifestly alien in terms of culture, religion or 
color.”9 As the threat of militant Catholicism diminished, the ‘Other’ took shape in the 
forms of a hostile Continental Europe and exotic overseas empire.10 
With the threat of danger gone after the Second World War and in face of 
imperial decline, Britain was looking for a something new against which it could define 
itself.  The focus moved away from an imperial identity; the option of developing a “new 
identity within a multiracial Commonwealth was being rejected in favor of more 
traditional modes of belonging, rooted in myths of little England.”11  Thus, Britons 
looked within their own shores in search of a new identity, and, consequently to find a 
new ‘Other.’  With colored immigration into the United Kingdom on the rise, it was to 
the black immigrant that Britons turned. 
The notion of what it meant, in a world-political sense, to be British had to 
readjust and in that painful readjustment there developed a much more 
exclusive concept of citizenship and a narrower vision of the kind of 
society Britain could become.  The narrowing of vision took many forms 
and it is hardly surprising in a society with a long colonial history that a 
redrawing of the emotional boundaries and images of nationhood would 
for many people take distinctly racist forms.12 
 
By the Second World War there were an estimated 7,000 non-white residents, 
mainly colonial seaman from the First World War, permanently settled in the port towns 
of Liverpool and Cardiff, and in Manchester and London’s East End.13 With the outbreak 
                                                 
9 Colley, Britons, 6. 
10 Ibid., 7. 
11 A colonial correspondent, “African Attitudes,” Twentieth Century 151 (1952): 19-25 cited in Chris 
Waters, “Dark Strangers in Our Midst: Discourses of Race and Nation in Britain, 1947-1963.” The Journal 
of British Studies (1997): 214. 
12 Bill Williamson, “Memories, Vision and Hope: Themes in an Historical Sociology of Britain since the 
Second World War,” Journal of Historical Sociology 1 (1998): 170.  
13 Figure taken from I. Spencer, “World War Two and the Making of Multiracial Britain,” in War Culture: 
Social Change and Changing Experience in World War Two Britain, ed. P. Kirkham and D. Thomas 
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of war in 1939 the situation changed. Britain found herself in need of labor in the 
munitions factories and services. Turning to her colonies, the government facilitated 
migration to the United Kingdom.  Over 10,000 West Indians were recruited to serve as 
ground crew members in the Royal Air Force in Britain; thousands of colonial seamen 
joined the merchant navy and a significant number of West Indians, Asians and Africans 
served with the Allied forces.14  
But the British government never desired nor expected the non-white colonials 
who came to Britain to support the war effort to stay.  The Colonial Office anticipated 
they would return to their place of origin as ‘good-will ambassadors,’ strengthening ties 
between the mother country and her imperial subjects.  However, working in Britain or 
serving abroad with the Allied forces broadened the horizons of those devoting 
themselves to the Allied cause.  They saw opportunity in the United Kingdom. The work 
they had done during the war was with great purpose; they were part of the national war 
effort and well received by the British public.  Colonial laborers were not faced with the 
racial prejudice and discrimination in housing and employment experienced by colored 
people settled in Britain before the war.  However, though welcome to work and reside in 
the United Kingdom in order to help the cause, it was never assumed that colored 
individuals would set up permanent residence. Furthermore, British tolerance ended when 
it came to relations between black men and white women.  Any potential ‘darkening of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1995), 209 cited in Sonya O. Rose, “Race, Empire and British wartime National Identity, 1939-45” 
Historical Research (2001): 222. 
14 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, Race, and Race Relations in Post-War 
Britain (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992): 11. 
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the residents of the metropole’ was seen as repugnant.  “Being British in Britain still 
meant being white.”15  
By 1945 the colored population in Britain was estimated between 10,000 and 
30,000.16 Unemployment was high in colonies such as Jamaica, averaging between 20 to 
35 percent, thus colonials headed to Britain in search of a decent paying job.17  But as 
Kathleen Paul noted, the decision of West Indians to migrate to the United Kingdom was 
based on more than just economics.  Having occupied the region for centuries, the British 
encouraged colonials to think of Great Britain as the center of ‘their’ empire, thus their 
identity was very much tied to a sense of Britishness.  With a good grasp of the English 
language and the nation’s history, colonials considered themselves British, therefore, 
migrating to the ‘mother country’ was “somewhat of a homeward journey.”18 But those 
awaiting their arrival did not share this sentiment.  As Paul explains, competing notions 
of Britishness existed. The formal nationality policy, to which colonial subjects 
subscribed, regarded all residents of the Empire as equal and was constructed to maintain 
and justify imperial control.  The informal policy, also devised as a means of imperial 
justification in that it deemed European races and cultures superior to others, was based 
on a racialized understanding of the world. “This informal identity restricted Britishness 
to white residents of the United Kingdom.”19  
                                                 
15 Rose, “Race, Empire and British wartime National Identity,” 226. 
 
16 Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1997): 113. 
17 Ceri Peach, West Indian Migration to Britain: A Social Geography (London: Oxford University Press, 
1969): 2, 23-5 in Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 114.  
18 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 114. 
19 Kathleen Paul, “’British Subjects and ‘British Stock’: Labour’s Postwar Imperialism” The Journal of 
British Studies (1995): 239. 
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As West Indian immigrants continued to arrive in Great Britain, concern and 
hostility amongst the political and social elite increased.  Those arriving post war were no 
longer seen as valuable additions to the wartime work force or armed services, nor were 
they brought in by the Colonial Office; rather they remained beyond its public control.  
Black migrants were deemed likely to provoke ‘problems,’ to incite racial conflict. They 
were labeled as “quarrelsome, lazy, unskilled and unenterprising.”20  While it is difficult 
to ascertain overall public opinion, it is likely that Britons of all social classes were 
influenced by the nation’s colonial and imperial past and those ideas that legitimized 
Britain’s superior role throughout the world.  But the political elite remained resolute in 
portraying Britain as a tolerant nation, one that was more tolerant than white Americans 
and certainly less racist than the Nazi regime they had served to defeat.  The government 
was determined to present a national image that reflected an open-minded, liberal Britain 
that welcomed colonial peoples as equal citizens of the empire/ commonwealth and 
would be granted independence once they were ready. “But that independence was 
always seen as involving a commonwealth of nations- that is retaining a political tie to 
Britain.”21 
The continued flow of colored immigrants to the United Kingdom after the 
Second World War ushered in a new era in British immigration policy and with it came 
new challenges to Britain’s political elite.  It was clear to both the Conservative and 
Labour parties that Britain could not afford to have her reputation as a beneficent colonial 
power diminished by the issue of race and existence of color bars, thus debates regarding 
the status and restriction of colored immigrants were kept behind closed doors.  But as 
                                                 
20 Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration, 35-36. 
21 Rose, “Race, Empire, and British Wartime National Identity,” 226. 
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Britain’s desire for great power status diminished, so did the need to placate those abroad.  
A nation for so long defined by its imperial role turned its focus inward- imperial identity 
waned and the notion of Britishness defined solely by those living within the United 
Kingdom flourished.  There was no place within this new model for the colored 
immigrant, as being British in Britain still meant being white.  Opposed to any notion of a 
multi-cultural society, the government began discussions of restrictive legislation.  
Coupled with a perceived increase in racial violence, these debates heightened public 
awareness, thus the immigration issue began its move towards the public arena.   
The young school teacher in Smethwick capitalized on the new found importance 
of race and immigration and Griffith’s overwhelming win made it clear that the 
restriction of colored immigrants into the United Kingdom was a critical issue amongst 
the British electorate.  The bipartisan effort to keep immigration out of public politics 
was being challenged. Making it clear that each party would have to take a position, the 
1964 election marked a brief hiatus from any bipartisan efforts to conceal the race and 
immigration issue.  No longer concerned with imperial status or a workforce to rebuild 
Britain, the Conservative and Labour parties were able to support restrictive legislation. 
But while both parties quickly realized that while taking a firm stance against colored 
immigration could certainly produce votes, they also discovered it could alienate a 
significant part of the electorate, thus the bipartisan effort to conceal the issue resurfaced.
  
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR 
 
 
The Labour government’s position towards Commonwealth immigration 
immediately following the Second World War was in part determined by the acute labor 
shortage Britain faced in the agricultural, coal mining and textile industries. In order to 
spearhead the reconstruction of the nation, it was vital the Atlee government find the 
means by which to rebuild Britain’s workforce.  In search of a short term solution, the 
administration formed a Foreign Labour Committee to take into consideration the 
increased importation of foreign labour.   
By the end of 1946 the Cabinet Manpower Working Party reported an estimated 
labour shortage of 1,346,000.
1 The Atlee government contemplated several means by which to reduce the 
deficit including appeals to older workers and women to remain or return to the 
workforce; initially it was determined that the importation of foreign labour would pose a 
‘problem.’2 The issue of race and the biological implications of immigration were part of 
Parliamentary debates surrounding migration from the start.  The Cabinet Foreign Labour 
Committee determined, “The question of utilising foreign labour obviously raises many 
                                                 
1 Cabinet Man-Power Working Party Memo, 30 November 1945, CAB 134/510 in Shirley Joshi and Bob 
Carter “The role of Labour in the creation of a racist Britain” Race & Class (1984): 56. 
2 Joshi, “The role of Labour in the creation of a racist Britain,” 56. 
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delicate social and political issues and these would have to be considered carefully.”3  
Ministers were wary of the long-term consequences of recruiting alien labor, advising 
that “any material increase in the foreign population of this country” be considered very 
carefully due to “the demographic issues involved.”4 
By 1947 there was bipartisan support for increased migration based on the 
argument that immigration was necessary to resolve the labour shortage.5 But 
Parliamentary debates on migration were not solely concerned with economics. It was 
argued that “immigration on a large scale into a fully established society like ours could 
only be welcomed without reserve if the immigrants were of good human stock and were 
not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the host population and 
becoming merged in it.”6  Home Secretary Chuter Ede remarked that “the intake could be 
limited to entrants from the Western countries, whose traditions and social backgrounds 
were more nearly equal to our own.”7 With a strong preference for European workers, the 
government favored the importation of Polish and Yugoslavian laborers under the pretext 
that white Europeans could be easily assimilated.  It was argued that they were made of 
“the spirit and stuff of which we can make Britons,”8 and they could be “assimilated into 
the British people, to become acquainted with, and to follow, the British way of life.”9 
During the debate on displaced persons, one Conservative MP claimed that “there are the 
                                                 
3 Cabinet Foreign Labour Committee Minutes (CFLC), CAB 134/301 in Joshi, “The role of Labour in the 
creation of a racist Britain,” 56. 
4 LAB 13/ 1005 Notes on an Interdepartmental Conference on the Welfare of EVWs, 18 November 1948 in 
Kathleen Paul, Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1997): 79. 
5 Mr. Paget, 433, House of Commons Debates, col. 756 (14 February 1947) in Robert Miles “Nationality, 
Citizenship, and Migration to Britain, 1944-1951” Journal of Law and Society (1989): 432. 
6 Report of the Royal Commission on Population, op. cit., n. 49, p. 124 in Miles “Nationality, Citizenship 
and Migration to Britain,” 434. 
7 CAB 134/301 FLC (46), 1st meeting, 14 March 1946 in Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 83. 
8 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., [1947], v. 433, c. 386-87 in Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 85. 
9 Ibid., [1947], v. 433, c. 386-87. 
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strongest possible ethnographical reasons for having an infusion of vigorous new blood 
from overseas at the present time,” noting that “we have very greatly benefited… from 
other foreign blood at different times in the course of our history.”10  References were 
made to “stock” and “race” claiming the biological advantages and suggesting that the 
British government “act quickly [and] get the best of the pick.”11  By instituting 
racialized criteria to determine which workers were considered the best ‘stock’, the 
‘source of supply’ was limited to Europe (with the exception of Ireland).  
In search of cheap labor, the Atlee government turned towards Polish soldiers 
who had fought under British command during the war and were still in military camps 
throughout Europe. Such troops remained the financial responsibility of the British, thus 
the government moved to solve two problems at once by offering Poles work in 
construction, agriculture and mining.  In May 1946 the government established the Polish 
Resettlement Corps to facilitate their entry into British society; officers from the Ministry 
of Labour served to guide Poles into civilian employment.12 But shortages continued 
forcing the Atlee government to look elsewhere for free labor.  Citing the success of the 
Polish workers, the administration advocated the importation of ex-prisoners of war and 
forced labor and Jews from Nazi concentration camps in West Germany and Austria. In 
September 1945, approximately 1.8 million displaced persons (DPs) were scattered 
                                                 
10 Martin Lindsay, House of Commons Debates, col. 758 (14 February 1947) in Miles “Nationality, 
Citizenship and Migration to Britain,” 433. 
11 Sir Arthur Salter, House of Commons Debates, col. 758 (14 February 1947) in Miles “Nationality, 
Citizenship and Migration to Britain,” 433. 
12 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 68. 
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across Europe.13  Employing aggressive campaign tactics to lure labor, the British 
government issued work permits to foreign labor at a rate of 35,000 per year.14  
Upon arrival, refugees were required to sign contracts accepting work assigned by 
the Minister of Labour. They were directed to employment in agriculture, textile 
production, coal mining and domestic service. Initially restricted in the work they could 
accept, after three years of residence, such restrictions were lifted.15 Due to the success of 
alien recruitment and a continued labor shortage, by Spring 1947 government officials 
began offering foreign laborers permanent settlement within the United Kingdom. This 
offer was extended based on the idea that Poles and other Europeans could become 
British. With a clear preference for importing white labor from the start, it was suggested 
that white workers were considered more suitable for the industries where labor was 
needed, but it was also assumed that they could easily assimilate into British society.  
Regardless of differences in culture, language and politics, the British elite believed these 
laborers could become British solely based on their common genetic makeup.16  
While European migrant workers may have been required to accept only specific 
jobs in designated industries and offered substandard government housing, they received 
better treatment than the British subjects who arrived from the colonies and 
Commonwealth.  These migrants represented another source of labor, albeit one that was 
ignored presumably because they were not considered of ‘good human stock.’17 In fact, 
                                                 
13 Mark Wyman, DP: Europe’s Displaced Persons, 1945-1951 (Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press, 1989) 
in Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 71. 
14 LAB 13/ 1098 Employment of Foreign Women in Domestic Employment in the United Kingdom, 
Preliminary Conference on Migration, 8 April 1950 in Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 75. 
15 Tannahill, op cit., n. 35, pp. 81, 133; E. Stadulis, “The Resettlement of Displaced Persons in the United 
Kingdom” Population Studies (1951/2): 213 in Miles “Nationality, Citizenship and Migration to Britain,” 
431. 
16 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 85. 
17  Miles “Nationality, Citizenship and Migration to Britain,” 434. 
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in 1948, when Geoffrey Isaacs, the Minister of Labour was informed that a ship carrying 
“some hundreds of West Indians, many of them ex-service men skilled in various trades” 
and in search of work was on its way to Britain, the Minister replied that the men would 
be sent to local employment exchanges, but that he could “give no assurance that they 
could be found suitable work” and that he hoped “no encouragement would be given to 
others to follow their example.”18 When asked if the government would make 
arrangements for these “British citizens in a strange land,” he rejected the notion stating 
that, “If they suffer any inconvenience, the blame will be on those that sent them not on 
those who receive them.”19  The British government essentially extended the benefits of 
membership to aliens deemed acceptable for assimilation based on their racial makeup 
while denying such rights to their own citizens.  Political decisions were clearly based on 
ideological assumptions, as the Labour Government chose to recruit alien labor from the 
Continent while failing to extend the same policies to British subjects of color.   
The government moved to distance itself from any racial prejudice and the issue 
of ‘colored immigration’ claiming there was “no colour prejudice at all with regard to 
[West Indian] employment.”  But debate ensued behind closed doors.  A correspondence 
between Sir Harold Wiles and M.M. Bevan on 8 March 1948 indicates that consideration 
was given to the idea of using ‘surplus colonial manpower’ to meet the labour shortage.  
Wiles suggested that: 
Unlike ex-prisoners of war or other aliens, I assume there could be no 
authority for deporting coloured British subjects if they felt they wished to 
stay here and take their chance.  If there were any assurance these people 
                                                 
18 Hansard, 8 June 1948, (451) 1851-3 in Joshi, “The role of Labour in the creation of a racist Britain,” 57. 
19 Ibid. 
 13
could in fact be sent away when they had served their purpose, this 
proposition might be less unacceptable.20  
 
Furthermore, he argued that he “did not think any scheme for the importation of coloured 
colonials for permanent settlement should be embarked upon without full understanding 
that this means that a coloured element will be brought in for permanent absorption into 
our own population.”21  
However determined the Labour government was to curb the flow of colored 
migration from the colonies, as Arthur Creech-Jones, MP pointed out when asked if the 
government intended on establishing a system by which West Indian migrants could be 
vetted out and it ascertained beforehand whether they were suitable for employment in 
Britain, British leaders could not “interfere with the movement of British subjects.”22 
While centuries of colonialism and an informal national policy deemed colonial subjects 
inferior and unworthy of certain British rights, British law stated otherwise- law that was 
introduced by the same Labour government.   
The Atlee administration’s proposal for legislation defining the status of British 
subjects was not based on a new found philosophy of equality, but rather in an effort to 
shore up Empire at the close of the Second World War.  By 1945 Britain's position as a 
world power had been diminished.  Most of its manufacturing infrastructure was 
destroyed, its export economy severely crippled, and its war debts totaled over £4.7 
billion.  Economically exhausted, its overseas assets had been liquidated, leaving its 
ability to influence international affairs severely hampered.   Determined to preserve its 
role alongside the U.S. and Soviet powers, the empire took on new significance in the 
                                                 
20 Letter from M.A. Wiles to M.M. Bevan, 8 March 1948 in Joshi, “The role of Labour in the creation of a 
racist Britain,” 59. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Hansard, 15 June 1948, (452) 421-2 in Joshi, “The role of Labour in the creation of a racist Britain,” 58. 
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postwar era.23 Representing the imperial population of Great Britain and the 
Commonwealth verses just those that inhabited the United Kingdom secured Britain a 
seat at the international table.  Thus, when the Canadian government proposed legislation 
defining independent Canadian citizenship, the Labour government was forced to counter 
with legislation of its own.   
Prior to 1945, the United Kingdom had permitted territories to create local 
citizenships intended to carry weight only in the area of origin.  In keeping with the 
notion of a single nationality throughout the Empire, Her Majesty’s Government held that 
residents of the Empire were first and foremost British subjects. Proposed Canadian 
legislation attempted to challenge the status quo, placing exclusive Canadian citizenship 
above the status of British subject.  Fearing that any attempt to forestall the scheme 
would divide the Commonwealth and in due course imperial unity as a whole, British 
policy makers determined it wise to placate Canadian officials. Thus, deliberations began 
to devise a British nationality law intending to appease Dominion governments while 
ultimately solidifying loyalty to the British crown. 
While policy makers were able to agree in terms of granting the dominions equal 
status, determining the position of colonials was met with difficulty.  An 
Interdepartmental Working Party was assembled to establish the best strategy for colonial 
status.  Countering the position of the Home and Foreign Offices that each colony should 
be granted a separate citizenship, the Colonial Office argued that in order to ensure 
colonials continued to regard themselves as British they must share a single, common 
nationality with the United Kingdom.  Bestowing a separate citizenship assigned them 
secondary status.    
                                                 
23 Dane Kennedy, Britain and Empire, 1880-1955 (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), 87. 
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Intent on securing imperial unity and preserving Britain's position at the center of 
the empire, the Atlee government put forth the 1948 British Nationality Act, creating a 
common citizenship for residents of the United Kingdom and its colonies.  Dominions 
were able to legislate their own citizenship laws, but these would remain secondary to 
those of the Great Britain.  Allowing Dominion governments the right to establish local 
citizenships appeased national governments while at the same time reaffirming their 
citizens' common status as British subject.   This overarching status as citizen of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies (UKC) remained predominant on the international stage 
and thus secured Britain's position as a world power. 
Although Conservative MPs were rather ambiguous towards the Bill, it did not 
pass without resistance. The main point of contention between the two parties lay in 
extending the status of British subject to citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.  
The opposition argued that citizens of the colonies and Commonwealth were already 
British subjects, as imperial nationality was a right granted to all those born within the 
Empire.  Such legislation served to weaken imperial links. Conservatives objected to the 
proposed UKC citizenship on the pretext that creating a single citizenship for such a 
diverse collection of peoples was unsuitable.  David Maxwell-Fyfe, the Conservative 
spokesman on home affairs, suggested that citizenship should be assigned based on a 
shared sense of community and status rather than parliamentary sovereignty.24  
Labour was willing to look past the informal policy in order to maintain the 
Empire and Britain’s international standing, while the Tories continued to cling to the 
                                                 
24 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 453 (1948), cols. 401, 410, 1027-28 in Paul, “British 
Subjects British Stock,” 248. 
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“familial ‘British’ community of the old dominions.”25  Labour’s goal was solely to ward 
off colonial independence and believed the Bill was a means by which they could give 
colonials “a feeling that… we recognize them as fellow citizens.”  But Labour’s objective 
of raising colonials “to such a position of education, of training, and of experience that 
they too shall be able to share the grant of full self-government which this House has so 
generously given in the last few years to other places” offered the same notion of 
superiority and inequality as the Conservative position that colonials should not share a 
common citizenship with those in the United Kingdom.26  While Labour’s paternalistic 
view may seem more palatable, the fact remains that both parties, regardless of 
intentions, held a racialized view of the Empire and the world.  The Labour government 
suggested colonials needed the British to educate and advance them, while Conservatives 
argued against the consideration of equal status.  Regardless of any formal policy, 
members of both parties had a clear definition of Britishness and it did not include 
colored residents of Britain’s overseas possessions.  
Nonetheless, both parties remained cognizant that Britain must present itself as a 
tolerant, progressive society. In the parliamentary debates Conservative Maxwell Fyfe 
stated, ‘We are proud that we impose no colour bar restrictions making it difficult for 
them when they come here … we must maintain our great metropolitan tradition of 
hospitality to everyone from every part of our Empire.”27 According to the Conservative 
policy of the next year, “there must be freedom of movement amongst its members 
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within the British Empire and Commonwealth.  New opportunities will present 
themselves not only in the countries overseas but in the Mother Country, and must be 
open to all citizens.”28 Committed to the right of free movement, Conservatives were 
concerned about the rights of those residing in the independent Commonwealth countries 
of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, but were aware that such rights 
would apply equally to the inhabitants in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia.  However, it 
was assumed the majority of migration would be movement from Britain to the Empire 
and that the source of any inward flow would be the Old Dominions. 
By 1953 an estimated 40,000 non-white of immigrants had arrived in Great 
Britain.  The influx of West Indian and South Asian migration was characterized by chain 
migration- individuals migrated, friends and relatives followed, who in turn sent for 
additional friends and relatives.  The first wave of immigrants took accommodations in 
the industrial towns in which they found jobs; they were later joined by relatives, 
allowing settlements of individuals from the same family or village to become 
concentrated in a single neighborhood.  The settlement pattern of colored migrants 
created ethnic pockets throughout Britain. For instance, the majority of Pakistanis, 
especially those from the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir, settled in the north, while 
Bangladeshis resided in East London and Gujarati Indians spread across the Midlands.29  
As the concentration in England’s major cities became evident, hostility towards new 
settlers from their white working-class neighbor’s became evident.  The British working 
class had accepted the notion of common citizenship under the assumption it would 
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remain theoretical, but when it seemed that colored migrants were to be treated as their 
equals, or rather that their own position of superiority in relation to blacks was no longer 
recognized, the white working-class became seriously concerned.30  
Black immigrants had been regarded with suspicion as early as 1919 when many 
colored men chose to remain in Britain after being discharged from His Majesty’s Forces 
and the Merchant Navy at the close of the First World War. The numbers were rather 
infinitesimal, but regardless of size, the colored population was nonetheless regarded as 
alien.  The black population was viewed as a potential threat to security, especially in 
terms of employment, thus it is no surprise that disturbances erupted between whites and 
colored migrants.  “Public opinion strongly favoured the repatriation of Negroes to the 
Colonies and many in fact were persuaded to return” and “attempts were make to prevent 
further Negro immigration and to encourage the replacement of coloured firemen by 
white on British ships.” 31 Thus the combined sense of superiority engrained in Britons 
through centuries of imperialism coupled with perceived competition in employment and 
services posed by the arrival of black migrants produced tensions throughout England 
defined solely by race. Notions of colored immigrants as lazy, unskilled individuals of 
low social status and bad hygiene began to spread.  As more West Indian and South 
Asian migrants arrived in England’s industrial towns, tensions grew. Sporadic outbreaks 
of violence against blacks erupted in Deptford, Notting Hill and Nottingham, lending 
credence to any notion that colored immigration posed a ‘problem’ in Britain.  British 
politicians found themselves facing new problems as the 1950s progressed.  While the 
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 20
d that:  
                                                
postwar Labour Government had moved to strengthen imperial ties and rebuild Britain’s 
workforce, the Conservative government of the next decade faced a new set of 
challenges.  The years immediately following the war have been described as somewhat 
“halcyon times, since politicians were able to take a relaxed attitude free of the pressures 
that haunted their successors in the next decade.”32  Home Secretary Roy Jenkins 
asserte
In the early fifties it was easy to be enlightened about immigration – easy 
both for the progressive middle class who have always judged 
immigration policy with the objective view that comes from rarely seeing 
a black face and never living next to a black neighbour, and for the 
industrial workers of Bradford and Birmingham.”33  
 
Jenkins argued that immigration was not a large issue until the latter half of the 1950s, as 
it was at this point that the Eden government began to discuss the implementation of 
restrictive legislation.
 
32 D.W. Dean “Conservative Governments and the Restriction of Commonwealth Immigration in the 
1950s: The Problems of Constraint” The Historical Journal (1992): 172. 
33 Ibid. 
  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE 1950s CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
There is a danger that may be faced with the need for 
urgent action when it is too late.  The ideal time for 
legislation cannot be defined by reference to any precise 
criteria and the prudent course would be to legislate 
without delay.1  
 
 
The arrival of colored immigrants to the United Kingdom posed a problem to 
fundamental liberal and conservative ideologies.  The rise and fall of Nazi Germany and 
its doctrine of racial supremacy challenged previous beliefs in that imperial justification 
on the basis of racial superiority was no longer acceptable.  Thus, by the inter-war period 
a new set of doctrines had been introduced in the form of the white man’s burden and the 
dual mandate, employing the notion of universal human rights, a belief shared by both 
political ideologies.  But Conservative politicians held that while all men should be 
afforded the same rights under the law, this did not necessarily translate into equal 
opportunity or equality of life chances.  The fundamentals of conservative political 
discussions were shaped by the idea that all men shared basic legal rights, but kept with 
the view that colonial natives should keep to their place.  Liberal ideology held that state 
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intervention was necessary to ensure freedom and equal opportunity, but the notion of 
universal human rights throughout the Empire forced liberalism to change its nature. 
Some Liberals answered with ardent anti-imperialism, while others chose to 
compartmentalize their ideology, suggesting it pertained only to the domestic metropolis.  
Thus, the migration of colonial natives to Britain presented a serious challenge to both 
conservative and liberal beliefs.2 
Members within the Labour and Conservative parties held different positions in 
terms of immigration.  Some Conservatives favored immigration on economic grounds, 
understanding the dire need for labor within Britain.  Former colonials often defended 
immigration in an effort to speak of for those they formerly governed.  But there was also 
a faction of the Conservative party that opposed immigration all along.  These members 
generally remained ‘backbenchers’ until given a voice by the 1958 riots and 1964 
election in Smethwick.  Labour radicals favored immigration on the same grounds as 
those Conservatives who had the economic development of Britain in mind; idealists 
favored immigration in order to keep the Commonwealth in tact.  In the minority before 
1963, Labour’s Conservative Right opposed non-white immigration purely on racial 
grounds, believing that regardless of the economic benefits colored migration presented, 
non-whites could not be assimilated or absorbed into British culture.  
Overall, the Labour party showed concern with immigration from the start.  In 
May 1950, the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued a memorandum requested by the 
Cabinet addressing the immigration of coloured people to the United Kingdom.  The 
report suggested that coloured immigration was posing problems in the areas of housing, 
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employment, and law and order and proposed discouraging coloured colonials from 
migrating as a potential solution; however, in ascertaining that the number of coloured 
migrants was still relatively small, the Labour government determined it unnecessary to 
take immediate action.3  The point is that the administration was considering it and it 
should be noted that there was serious concern amongst Labour politicians over the 
immigration of a few thousand black people.  The Cabinet revisited the issue one month 
later to review the possible measures for control and potential ramifications of restrictive 
legislation,4 but it was determined again that the coloured population in Britain was so 
small that taking any controversial action should be avoided, and though not justifiable at 
the time, any future increase may warrant control.5  
 The fact that the Labour government entered discussions about curbing colonial 
immigration while still in the midst of a labor shortage substantiates the claim that racial 
prejudice was a clear factor in the Labour government’s discouraging mindset.  While the 
attitude of trade unions and fear that the reconstruction effort would be short-lived played 
a part, had all imported labor been of pure European descent, restrictive measures would 
hardly have been discussed, as they were welcomed as a positive asset, while black 
workers were seen as provoking racial prejudice and causing public disturbances. Thus 
illegitimate reasons were invented by some civil servants in an attempt to justify control.6  
 Sharing Labour’s concerns and recognizing that a potential problem may be 
brewing, after taking power in 1951 the Conservative government began discussing 
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restrictive legislation, albeit behind closed doors.  Such legislation was not presented in 
the 1950s for several reasons centering on the desire to keep Britain in good standing 
with the Commonwealth and maintain her position as a world power; furthermore the 
Tories wanted to prove that they could resolve the economic problems resulting from the 
war and regain and solidify their position as the natural rulers of Britain. 
Issues abroad were beginning to pose problems, mainly the nationalist regime in 
Britain’s dominion of South Africa and its open segregationist policies.  World opinion 
held that the United Nations should intercede, a notion that the Conservative government 
did not support on the basis that stepping in may drive the nationalists further into 
isolation.  Nonetheless, worried about the international repercussions, British officials 
knew they needed to present themselves as hostile to the racist policies developing in the 
area and were aware that any sense of a race relations issue brewing in Britain would call 
their position into question.  As Lord Salisbury stated, ‘We have a reputation to maintain 
as champion of liberal western civilisation.  We must maintain this reputation not only in 
the UN but also before our public opinion and what is more important with our 
colonies.”7 
 The Churchill administration wanted to present an enlightened view of 
conservatism to the world, thus whenever suggestions of restriction were voiced in the 
Cabinet protests were raised in fear of a blanket policy which may prohibit the entry of 
Commonwealth citizens. Lord Hume stated, “we do not wish to keep out immigration is a 
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policy to which we have always subscribed,”8 his predecessor Lord Swinton suggesting 
that “If we legislate on immigration, though we draft in non-discriminatory terms, we 
cannot conceal the obvious fact that the object is to keep out coloured peoples.   Unless 
there is really a strong case for this, it would surely be an unwise moment to raise the 
issue when we are preaching and trying to practise partnership in the abolution of the 
Colour Bar.”9 Events in the southern United States highlighted racial tensions in the 
international arena, presenting an opportunity for British leadership to present the multi-
racial Commonwealth as a symbol of tolerance and newly enlightened force.10  
Concerned about the opposition’s reaction to proposed restrictions, Conservative 
leaders hesitated to put forth any legislation that may prove controversial; any changes to 
immigration policy needed to be free of partisan politics.  In order to prevent giving the 
Labour government an opportunity to take the moral high ground and avoid the 
embarrassment of having the opposition and half the Commonwealth against them, the 
Churchill administration deemed it necessary to gauge Labour opinion and possible 
reaction.  The Conservative government held deliberation over possible restrictive 
legislation in 1954 at which time Lord Swinton urged Cabinet Members to establish 
contact with members of the Labour party.11  
 There was cause to believe that the Labour party would adamantly oppose 
restrictions, as pressure against discrimination was always presented by Labour 
politicians, many of which pressed for legislation that would ensure equal treatment in 
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employment and housing. As Labour representative Kenneth Robinson stated, he 
“doubted if the government would introduce legislation to limit immigration because they 
know the opposition they would meet.”12 While it may have been a risk to adopt a 
position that may prove unpopular amongst the white, working class, Labour leaders did 
not think race would become an issue.  At the time, most discussions were held within 
confined political circles; they believed they had little to lose politically and perhaps 
more to gain by taking the moral high ground and opposing restriction. 
 Race may not have become an issue had the rate of immigration remained as it 
was at the beginning of the 1950s; however, the rate did increase- within twenty years 
there were 1.6 million colored people living in Britain.13 The changing demographic 
served to benefit the position of backbenchers such as Cyril Osborn, Normal Pannell, 
Harold Gurden, and Martin Lindsay who, opposing immigration, cited inflated figures 
and warned against the possible ramifications of mass immigration such as overcrowded 
hospitals, the resurfacing of diseases such as tuberculosis, and increased criminal 
activity.14  While racist ideas in Parliament remained the minority, the constituency for 
which they spoke began to increase steadily as the 1950s progressed.  In 1954 The Times 
published an article titled “First Signs of a British Colour Problem” and several years 
later the BBC presented a special program on the subject.  Public concern began to grow, 
centered on issues such as housing, particularly in the industrial areas and the suggestion 
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that slum conditions were worsening due to overcrowding an unsanitary conditions of 
West Indian and Asian immigrants. 
Reports issued by a 1958 working party noted that colored immigrants lived in 
“dirty and overcrowded conditions” which was “as much from choice as necessity,”15 
and that they were employed in unskilled jobs of the lowest grade industries.  According
to the reports, Southeast Asians were difficult to place in employment due to their 
inability to speak English
 
 
 [were] 
                                                
16 and unemployment was certain to increase due to the scarcity
of semi and unskilled jobs, which were “the only ones for which coloured people
suitable.”17 In addition, the working party noted that they were not Christian.18 But these 
same reports noted that the immigrants were “law-abiding, tend[ed] to keep to 
themselves, and form[ed] a useful addition to the country’s labour force.”19  Reports went 
on to describe the South Asian immigrants as showing “no desire to mix with white 
people or other immigrants” and noted that the “arrival of increasing numbers fosters the 
tendency to associate only with each other.”20  Police reports warned that the degree of 
assimilation failed to increase, but the British administration never attempted to promote 
the integration of such migrants.  Cabinet ministers focused solely on the prevention of 
further migration, never contemplating how the problems they believed to be associated 
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with migration could be ameliorated by any other means than nationality law.21  
Furthermore, cabinet papers note that this “lack of intermingling was due to the attitude 
of both races.”22  
The majority of immigrants in the early 1950s were West Indian; they were 
viewed as noisy and having loose sexual morals.  The high number of single men and 
convenience of a common language resulted in more interaction between the races and 
prostitution than would have been the case had families migrated together.23 The influx 
of South Asian migration in the late 1950s to early 1960s was characterized by chai
migration- individuals migrated, friends and relatives followed, who in turn sent for 
additional friends and relatives.  The first wave of immigrants took accommodations in 
the industrial towns in which they found jobs; they were later joined by relatives, 
allowing settlements of individuals from the same family or village to become 
concentrated in a single neighborhood, creating ethnic pockets throughout Britain. The 
segregation of communities came to be seen as the self-segregation created by 
immigrants; the belief spread that the ethnic community was attempting to create its own 
exclusive neighborhoods in an attempt to exclude whites and prevent the mixing of 
cultures.   
n 
                                                
In the summer of 1958 riots broke out between colored immigrants and whites in 
Nottingham and Notting Hill.  Labeled a ‘race riots’ by the press, it is unclear whether the 
actions were inspired by racial strife but, nonetheless, backbenchers pushing for 
restrictions attempted to use the events in their favor, arguing that “What we ignore at our 
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peril is the bitter resentment often felt by the local white English citizens.”24 Those 
favoring control began to lobby for restrictions as soon as Parliament returned to session; 
the cause was the same, but the arguments different.  “Sooner or later some control would 
have to be put on.  If it is not put on soon we shall, whether we like it or not- this is what 
I fear and am very frightened about it- have Little Rocks and Notting Hill incidents over 
and over again.”25 However, the administration decided it was not the opportune time to 
present such legislation, partly due to the recent Suez Crisis and its effects through out 
the Commonwealth.  
The immediate government reaction was to ensure that law and order was 
maintained in the areas.   
It would be desirable to make it clear that, in the view of the Government, 
law and order must be maintained irrespective of the racial characteristics 
of individuals. It would be important to avoid, if possible, any major 
pronouncement on Commonwealth immigration.  We should continue to 
deal with the problem empirically and shall base our action on the 
practical considerations of the availability of housing and the capacity of 
the labor market.26  
 
On the surface the government continued to support the notion of a common 
status for all Commonwealth citizens, however, behind closed doors were attempting to 
restrict entry by other means such as “administrative legislations and government 
circulars and letters.”27 The government adopted a series of administrative controls in an 
attempt to curb the flow stemming from the Indian sub-continent.  Such controls were 
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enforced by the governments of India and Pakistan.  Passport application fees were 
increased and deposits required to cover possible repatriation fees.28 Passports were 
denied on the basis that prospects did not intend on permanently establishing themselves 
in the United Kingdom29, and notices were placed in Indian newspapers detailing the 
harsh living conditions and unemployment migrants were likely to find in Britain. 
Public awareness of the immigration situation had been building through the 
1950; by the end of the decade public opinion became more important to the political 
parties, thus, Conservative and Labour leaders were forced to formulate party policy.  
The Tories remained divided, with some believing there was considerable support behind 
the idea of restrictive immigration while others feared taking any controversial position 
so close to an election.  The Labour party reacted by moving towards the opposition of 
controls and proposition of discrimination laws, however, there were clear anti-immigrant 
and racist feelings within the trade union movement which the Parliamentary Labour 
Party chose to ignore for purposes of political expediency.30 Although discussions on 
immigration control became more public, the leadership of both parties avoided 
commenting on the race issue outright.  However, Tory candidates used racial innuendo 
to attack some Labour candidates with liberal records in terms of immigration, and 
Conservative backbenchers placed increased pressure on the leadership of their own party 
to control immigration. 
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To the credit of party leadership, immigration and race relations were not part of 
the 1959 election.31 With the Tories returning to power, it was likely no serious 
consideration was going to be given to restrictive legislation or any anti-discrimination 
laws, however, the resounding Conservative victory brought a faction of new Members to 
the House of Commons who, hailing from constituencies with a large number of 
immigrants, favored demands for control.32 These members could claim direct 
constituency experience of the difficulties associated with immigration- a claim which, 
for reasons of electoral geography, was previously mainly confined to Labour Members. 
But perhaps most significant, these Members were claiming the view they were putting 
forward as representative of public opinion at large.  In this claim they were assisted by 
the setting up in the Birmingham area of a lobbying organization, the Birmingham 
Immigration Control Association.33  
Given a voice by the ‘riots’ of 1958 and fostered by the election of Ministers 
favoring their cause, political ‘backbenchers’ not only became more vocal, but also 
started to organize their efforts.  At the beginning of 1961, Conservative MP for Selly 
Oak, Harold Gurden, organized a private meeting of backbenchers from London, 
Birmingham, Liverpool, and Manchester, all areas with large concentrations of coloured 
migrants, to organize their efforts to support restrictive legislation.34 A motion was 
presented by Cyril Osborne that required Commonwealth immigrants to present evidence 
that they had guaranteed employment and housing, were in good health and no criminal 
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record in order to reside in Britain, suggesting that such measures were necessary to do 
the housing crisis, unemployment rates, growth of slums, and strain on welfare services. 
Nationally, unemployment wasn’t necessarily a grave issue however rates remained high 
in areas where there were large concentrations of immigrants.  But what backbenchers 
failed to mention was that as much as one-third of unemployed immigrants were women 
and two-thirds had been out of work for less than eight weeks.35  
But the racial motives behind such positions were illuminated by remarks made 
by Osborne and other proponents of control.  Osborne stated that the reasons colored 
immigrants were such a ‘problem’ was because “they have altogether a different standard 
of civilization,”36 and that “This is a white man’s country and I was it to remain so.”37 
Osborne and Pannell went on to contend that the construction of a Sikh temple in 
Smethwick served as a threat to Christianity and that the influx of immigrants was 
causing a serious outbreak of venereal disease.38 While some Members showed genuine 
concern based on housing and employment issues, the debates still took on an openly 
racial tone.  But party leadership continued to minimize every problem mentioned in an 
attempt to avoid any notions of discrimination.  Ironically, David Renton, government 
spokesman and Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office stated that the 
problems would become worse if immigration continued, declaring that although 
Government was not ready to take action, they were considering possible solutions.39 
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Fred van Hardsvedlt argued that “no rational political can afford to ignore an 
issue of concern to more than 80 percent of the electorate,” but the question remains 
whether the vast majority of Britons opposed colored immigration to the extent that the 
backbenchers claimed.40  Home Secretary R.A. Butler openly admitted that the 
Government had begun to move towards control, but it is necessary to investigate 
whether public opinion drove government or the actions of the political elite shaped 
public opinion.  While some believe that public opinion created pressures on 
Government, many argue that it as the government that politicized the problems 
associated with coloured immigration in order to show the public the necessity of 
introduction immigration control;41 although public opinion is often perceived by a few 
observers as creating pressures on the Government to pass restrictive legislation, many 
claim that actions and inactions of elite political were responsible for the state of public 
opinion and for governmental action in the fields of race relations and immigration 
policy.42 Furthermore, in light of the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill 
of 1962, we must ask what caused Government to abandon the policy they firmly 
believed would solidify their position as a world power.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
TOWARDS RESTRICTION AND INTO THE PUBLIC GAZE 
 
 
Through the 1940s and early 1950s there was little official or public concern 
about the flow of migration from the New Commonwealth.  Such migration was accepted 
by the Labour and Conservative Governments on the basis that it was part of the joint 
economic effort to rebuild Britain after the Second World War and the belief that liberal 
legislation was necessary in order to maintain Commonwealth unity.  The arrival of 
colored immigrants caused little reaction from the British public; it was generally 
assumed that such migrants would assimilate culturally and economically into greater 
British society.  The issue remained in a ‘pre-political age’ due to an unspoken consensus 
that any problems that existed would right themselves in the end.1 Some Conservative 
backbenchers voiced discontent and several attempts made at the Cabinet level to limit 
the number arrivals, none of which really came to fruition due to the Nationality Act of 
1948.  Restricting immigration would involve amending the Act, which was both a 
complicated parliamentary procedure and an act the government wanted to avoid for 
reasons highlighted previously.2 
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Following the 1958 riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill, incidents that 
influenced Conservative backbenchers, brought more illiberal parliamentary candidates 
to office, and sparked a sense of xenophobia within Conservative local organizations, the 
race and immigration issue was becoming more and more divisive.3  Initially the two 
parties held opposite views on the issue; the Conservative leadership was beginning to 
react to the pressure from those favoring restrictions, while Labour remained vehemently 
opposed.  However, within a few years, the debate moved from polarization to consensus.  
In an effort to prohibit the issue from electoral contests, both parties adopted moderate 
and somewhat interchangeable positions on immigration.4  
Through out the 1950s the Labour Party was dominated by those who supported 
human equality, but as the decade came to a close, party leaders began to recognize the 
political dangers of taking such a position.  As the controversy grew more intense, it 
began to take on unmistakable political overtones.  In July 1960 the official policy of free 
entry still remained, but increasing pressure was placed on the governments of Pakistan, 
India and the West Indies to control emigration from their ports.  In the meantime, local 
Conservatives began to challenge Labour candidates with more openly racist campaigns; 
the Tories implied that Labour favored immigration, later associating any issues 
associated with blacks as problems fostered by Labour’s position.5  
 In 1962 a faction of the Labour party supporting a centrist view emerged.  
Members such as Richard Crossman, Roy Hattersley, Frank Soskice, and Labour leader 
Harold Wilson supported entry restrictions on the grounds that they would allay the sense 
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of xenophobia emerging in Britain; a position that, unlike that of the Conservatives, was 
not racially prejudice.  However, it is important to note that the main concern of Labour 
was to become the majority party in Britain which they believed they could accomplish 
by taking the middle ground.  They believed race issue as politically volatile, a “political 
joker that not only could impede Labour from immediately gaining power but, also, and 
perhaps more importantly, deflect the party from its post-1951 adherence to centrist, non-
ideological politics.”6 Labour’s new race policy was merely part of a strategy, which 
while repugnant to the party’s Left, was viewed as fundamental to Centrists in an effort to 
gain national office.  Centrist MPs firmly believed that the only way to gain a 
parliamentary majority was to capture the middle-ground and to do so must “project a 
more contemporary, classless image than in the past;” to be “regarded as efficient, 
energetic and up-to-date – concerned with the problems of the 60s and the new Britain.”7 
Thus, party leaders made the decision to avoid all policy commitments that might 
polarize public opinion along party lines and adopted the same position as the opposition.  
As Richard Crossman stated, “We felt we had to out-trump the Tories by doing what they 
would have done and so transforming their policy into a bipartisan policy.”8  By aligning 
with the political opposition, Labour leaders hoped to avoid taking a position that may 
require public defense.9 
  Research shows that the Conservative Government of the 1950s sought evidence 
proving that colored immigration posed a problem in Britain in order to justify the 
consideration and later implementation of legislation restricting the British settlement of 
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colored migrants from the New Commonwealth.  In 1955 the Cabinet ascertained that 
public opinion had not ‘matured sufficiently’ enough to guarantee support for restrictive 
measures.10  Opinion poll data shows that in 1951, only a third of those polled were 
opposed to the entry of British subjects from the colonies; in 1956, as much as 71 percent 
agreed that ‘coloured’ British subjects had a right to enter Britain when compared to 
European migrants such as Italians and Poles.11 Yet just a few years later, polls suggest 
widespread support for immigration control.12  
Public opinion seemed to change drastically in just a few years time.  Originally 
tolerant of migration from the Commonwealth, the British public began to take a rather 
hostile stance.  Robert Miles suggests that contrary to arguments that racist ideals 
stemming from a colonial past permeated all of British society, British public opinion 
regarding colonial immigration remained rather fluid.  He argues against the notion that 
racism was a monolithic ideological bloc, noting that while propaganda such as 
contemporary newspaper headlines and racially charged cartoons were present, what 
needs to be examined is whether or not the British public actually received the message 
and whether it remained relevant.13  Furthermore, it is important consider the impact of 
government action on the nature of British public opinion.  In moving towards restriction, 
were the political elite responding to mass opinion, or had the government cultivated an 
atmosphere of intolerance in order to justify restrictive measures? 
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Through out the 1950s and into the 1960s, the importance of Commonwealth had 
begun to fade.  The Cold War of the 1960s brought in what Harold Macmillan called ‘the 
winds of change;’ the United States and Soviet Union began to vie for the support of 
independence movements in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, severely marginalizing and 
sense of British influence.14 At the heart of the matter was the economy.  Exhausted from 
the cost of the war, Britain was no longer able to afford her empire, as new military 
technology had made imperial defense much more expensive, albeit the costs of empire 
had begun to outweigh the benefits long before.  British defense expenditures amounted 
to 5.8 percent of gross national product between 1947 and 1987; no longer able to 
manage her trade deficit with the income from overseas investments, Britain faced a 
crushing foreign debt burden, not to mention that the much larger costs of nationalized 
health care, transport and industry had to be met.15  After the Second World War, Britain 
turned to the United States for a loan, the ramifications of which proved grave, ultimately 
diminishing Britain’s international power.  In return for the loan, US policy makers 
insisted the conversion of the pound into the dollar within a year, resulting in a run on the 
Bank of England and starting the first is a series of sterling crises.   “In the early 1950s, 
Harold Macmillan declared that the choice facing the country was between ‘the slide into 
a shoddy and slushy Socialism (and second rate power), or the march to the third British 
Empire.’ After Suez only the first option seemed to remain.”16  
The total of trade with the Commonwealth remained substantially large, but after 
the British entry into the ‘Common Market,’ European protectionist tariffs forced British 
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trade to focus on the continent rather than the Commonwealth.  But the issue with the 
Commonwealth was not necessarily its waning economic importance to the United 
Kingdom, but rather its growing political impotence.17 With Britain’s gradual decline, 
international dominance was no longer of drastic importance.  Political leaders turned 
their focus away from the preservation of Empire and Commonwealth and towards the 
maintenance of Great Britain itself.  With Commonwealth unity no longer at the forefront 
of political minds, the government was able to consider restrictive legislation, regardless 
of its implications. Thus, the Conservative government passed the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act in 1962 because, “the formal policy was no longer capable of 
maintaining Empire in its most desirable form…its commitment to free entry threatened 
the political elite’s perception of the true identity of the ‘British’ people.”18 
The actions of government and state officials were partly motivated by racism, 
and in terms of racism within the overall British population, many argue that this was 
simply a means by which to legitimize the actions taken by the political elite.  Citing the 
overall unity of British society as their goal, decision-makers believed it necessary to 
prevent “a significant change in the racial character of the English people.”19 Convinced 
any significant change in the racial makeup of Britain would pose serious problems 
between ‘whites’ and ‘coloured people,’ leaders believed it necessary to manipulated 
public opinion in an effort to ensure that the British public reached the same conclusions.  
Public opinion on the issue had barely formed in the late 1940s into the 1950s, thus 
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British officials needed to convince the masses that the presence of colored immigrants 
was problematic and, thus, needed to be prevented.20  
At the end of 1960 the Home Office contemplated possible administrative and 
regulatory means which might be employed in order to reduce immigration form certain 
parts of the Commonwealth, but their efforts proved ineffective.  As Colonial Secretary 
Iain MacLeod stated, “administrative measures will not really serve.  The choice must be 
between trying to hold these administrative measures or legislation.”21 Thus, a Cabinet 
committee was formed to examine immigration and consider the possibility for broad 
legislative controls.22  Determined to exhaust all ideas surrounding limited emigration 
and not yet committed to restrictive legislation, the Government placed the issue of 
immigration on the agenda for the 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference.23 
The placement of immigration control on the back burner fueled the cause of 
backbenchers, prompting them to respond with new found vigor. In a letter to The Times, 
Harold Gurden, MP stated that the ‘saturation point’ of immigration had been reached 
throughout the Midlands.24 Conversations surrounding controls became more 
widespread, pushing the issue into the public eye and increasing the urgency for 
restrict
 
ns 
                                                
ive measures.   
Immigration Control Associations began to form at the end of 1960 and beginning
of 1961 to lobby Parliament and publicize the dire need for legislation.  The associatio
took on extremely racist tones.  Letters were published speaking to the threat colored 
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immigration posed to “the spirit and purity of white Christians,” the dangers of a multi-
racial society,25 and notions of overcrowded hospitals and strange diseases continued. 
The most powerful organization was the Birmingham Immigration Control Association 
(BICA).  The organization, formed in October 1960, called for restrictions to immigr
settlement within Birmingham; their cause was given a great deal of publicity in the 
Birmingham Mail.  The group sent postcards to the House of Commons declar
residents of Birmingham were “’suffering the consequences’ of uncontrolled 
immigration, and called on Members of Parliament to ‘vote against the come-who-m
policy’ or lose the sender’s vote;” the group went on to circulate petitions for Cyril 
Osborne, collecting some 50,000 signatures.
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Parliament forced a decisive response from Conservative party leadership.28 At the 
annual conference of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations held 
in October 1961, Home Secretary R.A. Butler announced that all possible solutions had 
been considered and ultimately found ineffective, thus, immigration controls were 
necessary and that restrictive legislation would be introduced.29 The Commonwealth 
Immigrant Bill was published twenty four hours after Parliament opened on November 1, 
1961, receiving Royal Assent on April 18, 1962.30  
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and R.A. Butler cited the cost of housing and 
influx of migrants as the official reasons for the Bill, noting that the tendency of 
immigrants to cluster into certain areas was causing social problems in Britain.  They 
claimed that the government would not be able to control such problems if immigrants 
continued to arrive at the current rate.  The Bill introduced a voucher system, granting 
migrants entry based on their skill and whether they had secured employment before 
arrival.  But the Bill clearly had a color bias, as the Irish were conveniently exempt- all 
other groups arriving in significant numbers were colored.  
The Labour opposition to the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was led by Hugh 
Gaitskell who argued that the “bill will be regarded very largely throughout the world as 
the imposition of a colour bar…”31 He cautioned against restricting Commonwealth 
migrants while opening the door to Europeans by entering the European Economic 
Community, stating that it was a “very sad day for the Commonwealth” and that the true 
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motive for the Bill was “colour and fear of racial disorder.”32 Other liberals agreed in 
terms of the racial bias and its certain effect on Commonwealth relations, thus urging the 
Labour party to eliminate it at first chance.33  But with Gaitskell’s death in January 1963, 
Harold Wilson, now leading the Party, moved away from the opposing position, later that 
year conceding that control was necessary and suggesting Labour’s position never 
changed, as it was Tory methods of control they had opposed all along not the 
Conservative position. 
By the time the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was adopted in 1962 there were 
already an estimated 400,000+ migrants from the West Indies, India and Pakistan living 
in Great Britain.  The government was primarily concerned with halting the flow of new 
immigrants; by time action was taken, Britain was already a multicultural society.  Some 
suggest that it was the Act itself that created a multiracial society as it allowed for family 
reunification and high quotas on new immigration.34  Whether or not the clear influx if 
immigration was due to the imminence of the Act is still a matter of debate, but the fact 
remains that between 1940 and 1950, 211,640 people emigrated from India, Pakistan and 
the Caribbean; during 1961 and the first half of 1962, before the Act came into force, 
191,060 arrived on British shores.35  
The talk of restrictions and formation of control associations pushed the race and 
immigration onto the public stage.  A subject previously debated in Cabinet surgeries was 
beginning to receive public attention.  In their vigorous attempt to pressure party leaders, 
political backbenchers were more apt to participate in editorial debates and make public 
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statements, the content of which became more and more exaggerated and racially 
charged. 
In a meeting of the West Indian Immigrants Committee in December 1961, it was 
stated that: 
Since the public discussion of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill there 
had undoubtedly been increased sensitivity amount West Indians, who 
were worried about the likely attitude of their English neighbors.  There 
was a feeling that those people who were prejudiced against coloured 
people might feel strengthened in their attitude by the Government 
decision to introduce legislation.36   
 
Furthermore, the Commission had received reports of “West Indians having been insulted 
in the streets and public houses,” and since the publication of the Bill there had also been 
an increase in activity of organizations opposing colored immigration.  It was reported 
that the Commission had received a vast number of reports suggesting there was a 
significant change in the attitude of police officers against West Indians; “there had been 
many allegations of physical manhandling of West Indians by the police.”37  
Growing local tensions spurred civic-minded white residents to create Voluntary 
Liaison Committees (VLCs) in many cities. With the aid of local churches and councils, 
such organizations sought to assist immigrants to get settled in their new home.  They 
carried out a diverse set of functions including the delivery of juridical and social services 
such as the administration of English classes.  The committees had a paternalistic 
conception of the welfare of immigrants, as they were primarily focused on explaining to 
colored migrants how to conform to British society.   At the time of creation, they were 
neither efficient nor politically expedient.  Generally run by volunteers, VLCs were 
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marginal on the political scene in the 1940s and 1950s.  They were generally ignored by 
local councils, who had little to no interest.  Some scholars of immigration politics favor 
a Marxist-inspired argument that VLCs served to control minority populations and shield 
them from local politicians, thus contributing to the non-politicization of racial issues, 
while other suggest that the Committees contributed to the local attitude of benign 
neglect that was present on the national scene.  However, the VLCs did have a serious 
impact on how the issue would be dealt with nationally in that they encouraged the 
central government to see the problem as one that should be dealt with locally; there 
presence in the 1940s and 1950s can in some ways be seen as placing racial issues on the 
path of local politics rather than national.38  
 Regardless of the actions and influence of Volunteer Liaison Committees and the 
positions taken by the Conservative and Labour parties in order to marginalize race and 
immigration, the issue exploded onto the national scene shortly after the introduction of 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, mainly as a result of the shocking events that 
occurred in the Midlands town of Smethwick.  Determined to seize the parliamentary seat 
that had been held by Labour for almost twenty years, the Conservative candidate, Peter 
Griffiths, chose to run on an openly racist platform, tackling the colored immigration 
issue outright.  The nature of his campaign and the ultimate results would have a long and 
lasting impact on race and immigration in British party politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SMETHWICK AND AFTER 
 
 
I have come here to visit because I am disturbed by reports 
that coloured people in Smethwick are being treated badly.  
I have heard that they are being treated as the Jews under 
Hitler.  I wait for the fascist element in Smethwick to erect 
gas ovens. -Malcolm X, February 1965 
 
 
Immigration first entered the political scene in Smethwick during the local 
elections of 1960 when a Conservative candidate for the Soho Ward ran on a policy of 
evicting colored people from overcrowded houses without government responsibility to 
assist in their relocation.  Running on a racist platform, the Conservative almost won the 
Labour seat at a time when Smethwick Tories, riding on their Party’s current fortunes, 
gained four seats on the Smethwick Council and for the first time threatened the well-
established Labour majority.  Shortly after the 1960 campaign a series of disturbances 
dubbed as ‘race riots’ broke out on the borders of Dudley and Smethwick, following 
which a wave of letters on immigration began to appear in the local newspapers, the 
publication of  which continued almost unabated until the General Election of 1964. 
In 1960 a long series of letters written by Lawrence Rieper, a retired bank officer 
from Manchester, vehemently opposing colored immigration were published in the 
Smethwick Telephone, a widely circulated local paper.  The paper served as a vehicle to 
spread racist propaganda, facilitating Rieper’s correspondence with Donald Finney, an 
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engineer from Smethwick who joined Rieper in a long campaign violently opposed to the 
settlement of colored people within Britain.  In an effort to spark fear amongst the 
Smethwick population, Finney included exaggerated and unsubstantiated statistics in his 
letters.  In February 1961 he wrote: 
I wonder how many people realize that in 1951 we had 19 people known 
to have leprosy and in 1959, the total jumped to 317 known sufferers in 
England.  In five years’ time, at the present rate immigrants are coming 
into this country, I suppose it will be 1,000 with leprosy.  In 1939 there 
was no leprosy in England and tuberculosis had been stamped out.  Now 
our hospitals are full again.1  
 
One month later, at the request of a leading Birmingham councilor, Finney 
announced the formation of a branch of the Birmingham Immigration Control 
Association in Smethwick.  Over three hundred people attended the committees first 
meeting, with an excess of five hundred signing up in the weeks that followed.  The 
group organized the circulation of petitions calling for immigration control, ultimately 
sending thousands of signatures to Cyril Osborne who was making similar efforts on the 
national level.  Pamphlets were assembled and circulated throughout the district calling 
for individuals to ‘wake up’ and take action against the immigrant invasion. 
 Foot soldiers for the Smethwick branch canvassed the area en masse; their efforts 
to spread propaganda were organized and extremely effective.  Regardless of the veracity 
of their claims, the average Smethwick resident could not tell the difference between fact 
and fiction.  Furthermore, the leap from real to fantastic was simple; propagandists turned 
the reality that Asians were more prone to tuberculosis into the notion that all blacks 
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spread dreadful diseases and spun the fact that immigrants resided in multi-occupied 
slums into the idea that they ‘lived like cattle.’2   
 Events that occurred over the summer of 1961 supported the claims of the 
Smethwick branch, bringing their cause into the national spotlight.  After a ‘Korean war 
veteran’ was evicted from a home owned and occupied by Indians, the organization 
circulated a petition arguing that the man had been evicted simply because he was white.  
Shortly after, the Labour-controlled council agreed to house a Pakistani whose home had 
been demolished due to slum clearing.  Residents of the area of relocation were outraged, 
threatening to withhold rent should the colored immigrant be granted accommodation; 
their efforts proved fruitless.  Nonetheless, the events further provoked agitators, leading 
to increased correspondence in the Smethwick Telephone; articles and letters addressing 
the ‘Growing Colour Problem’ appeared on a regular basis.3  
 Until that summer, the Smethwick branch had steered clear of party politics.  
They trusted neither the Conservative nor the Labour party, believing both would 
conform to any policy necessary to capture votes- even the colored vote.  But as time 
went on and it became clear that the Conservatives were moving towards the introduction 
of restrictive legislation, the Association called for “an en bloc Labour resignation [in 
order to] get Smethwick run by councilors who are servants of the people of 
Smethwick.”4  The organization’s newfound support for the Conservative party aroused 
Labour leaders. Accusing the Smethwick branch of being directly connected with 
Conservatives, Patrick Gordon Walker, the Labour Minister who had held Smethwick’s 
seat for almost twenty years, refused to speak at a BICA engagement and following the 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 36-7. 
3 Ibid., 38. 
4 Ibid., 39. 
 48
introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, delivered a speech in opposition of 
the Bill, further provoking the Association’s members. 
 In March of 1962 the Smethwick branch of the Immigration Control Association 
was dissolved.  Shortly after, Finney, Association founder and former leader officially 
joined the Conservative party, joining forces with Peter Griffiths, a school teacher, leader 
of council Conservatives, and Conservative Parliamentary candidate for the Smethwick 
constituency.  Griffiths was different from previous Conservative candidates in that he 
was not a member of society’s higher echelons, but rather a ‘man of the people.’  He was 
also a strong supporter of teacher’s unions, favored more schools, higher salaries, and 
better benefits for the unemployed.    
 As Paul Foot argued, a common misconception about Griffiths is that he was a 
political opportunist who adopted an anti-immigration stance once the political 
advantages became evident.  Prior to immigration becoming a significant political issue, 
Griffiths took a stand in favor of restrictions, stating that: 
Immigration into this country should be limited to persons of sound health 
who have jobs and living accommodation arranged before they enter.  
Preference should be given to persons holding British passports.  
Immigrants should not be permitted to remain here without working, or to 
overcrowd their housing accommodation.5 
 
Foot noted that this statement was made without provocation and in absence of any 
electoral advantage.  Griffiths’ interest in immigration as a political issue became evident 
in 1961 when he led the Smethwick council in drafting a letter to Harold Gurden, MP for 
Birmingham, in support of his demands for immigration control.  After joining forces 
with Finney in 1962, Griffiths began addressing the immigration issue in his weekly 
political columns in the Smethwick Telephone, using the column to spread racial 
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propaganda as well as attack his opposition, Patrick Gordon Walker, making such 
statements as “We do not want another Varna Road in Smethwick” (a street in 
Birmingham known for it’s prostitutes), that a single incident in Smethwick could result 
in race riots, and “As our MP [addressing Gordon-Walker] you have been a dead loss- no 
doubt you’ll get a medal from the West Indies.”6  
 The campaign slogan “If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Labour” appeared in 
July 1963 when Gordon-Walker reported that school children had been organized to 
chant the slogan.  Griffiths’ responded that, “We can’t stop children reflecting the views 
of their parents.  The people of Smethwick certainly don’t want integration.”  He went 
onto tell The Times, “I would not condemn anyone who said that.  I regard it as a 
manifestation of popular feeling.”7  Immigration had become the main theme of 
Griffith’s campaign.  He made statements about the moral dangers the presence of 
Indians posed to white girls, saying that he had personally seen young ladies entering the
homes of such immigrants, called for a ten-year residential qualification for immigrants 
displaced due slum clearance, and referred to colored residents as “Labour’s immigran
friends.” In January 1964 he 
 
t 
wrote that: 
                                                
Apparently the plight of English children held back by the presence of 
non-English speaking children in a class doesn’t bother the immigrant 
leaders.  Well, it bothers the Smethwick Tories and our kids are going to 
get a square deal in spite of the combined opposition of the Socialists and 
their immigrant friends.8  
 
In his official election address he wrote that: 
I shall press for the strictest possible control of immigration.  We British 
must decide who shall or shall not enter our country.  So vital a matter 
cannot be left to other Governments.  Overcrowding and dirty conditions 
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must be ended.  There must be no entry permits for criminals, the 
unhealthy or those unwilling to work.  Our streets must once again be safe 
at night.9  
 
A campaign was also launched directly attacking Gordon Walker, spreading callous 
rumors that he had sold his house to blacks, that he went to the West Indies to recruit 
blacks, that his wife was black, and that all of his daughters had married blacks. Patrick 
Gordon Walker responded that “Labour favours continued control of immigration, 
stricter health checks and deportation of those convicted of criminal offences.”  He 
thought this simple statement may be enough to pacify his critics.10 
 The people of Smethwick cast their votes on October 15, 1964.  Peter Griffiths 
defeated Patrick Gordon Walker with a swing of 7.3% to the Conservative party in a year 
when the national average of 2.9% swung towards Labour.  The shock was not so much 
that Griffiths won, nor that race and immigration played such a prominent part in a 
general election- such feelings towards the issues had been on the verge of eruption.  
What was amazing was that the sentiment was expressed so openly.  With the trickle of 
Commonwealth immigration turning into a flood and former colonies such as Africa and 
the Caribbean gaining political independence, the issues of race, nationalism, colonialism 
and the end of Empire were certainly a part of the electoral agenda that year.  
Furthermore, given the exposure to events in the southern United States and South Africa 
through television news, Britons were undoubtedly more aware of current racial strife.  
But although race was seen as an important issue, it had not been considered a 
determining factor- until Smethwick. 
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 The Smethwick results raised the visibility of the race issue on a national level, 
due solely to the vicious nature of the contest.  Furthermore, the outcome confirmed anti-
immigrant views that the public was behind their cause. More importantly, the outcome 
had a resounding effect on both parties’ position, especially Labour, making it evident 
that taking a racist position could, in fact, deliver electoral dividends.  Anti-immigrant 
candidates in Southall and Birmingham Perry Bar had done also well, sparking fear 
within the Labour party and increasing the vulnerability of the new Labour government.11   
Newly elected Labour Prime Minster Harold Wilson accused Griffiths of 
manipulating the race issue in order to gain a political advantage, describing the new 
Conservative Member as a ‘parliamentary leper’ who would return to ‘oblivion; in the 
next general election. In a public address he asked: 
Is the Leader of the Opposition proud of hon. friend the Member for 
Smethwick? Does he now intend to take him to his bosom?  Will the 
Conservative whip be extended to him, because if he does accept him as a 
colleague he will make this clear; he will betray the principles which not 
only his party but also his nation have hitherto had the right to proclaim.12 
 
Wilson’s direct attack on Griffith’s shocked many Conservative politicians, while the 
leader of the Opposition’s refusal to comment on the Griffiths’ campaign angered Labour 
Members.   
Prior to the election, then Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home appeared on a 
national broadcast where he responded to statements in which Griffiths where he claimed 
that “Smethwick rejected the idea of being a multi-racial society”  Douglas-Home 
commented that “We should not indulge in statements of this kind… Every Conservative 
candidate and certainly any member of the government and Conservative Party, would 
                                                 
11 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, Race and Race Relations in Post-War 
Britain (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992): 78. 
12 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, 66. 
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reject any feeling of racial discrimination and we should not indulge in this kind of 
statement.”  Griffiths responded with a comment in the Birmingham Evening Post, 
stating that he “still believe[d] the people of Smethwick reject[ed] the idea of a multi-
racial society in the town.”  The incident prompted Gordon Walker to draft a letter to 
Douglas-Home addressing the nature of the Griffiths’ campaign asking the Prime 
Minister to “repudiate specifically and publicly Alderman Griffiths repeated statement of 
a view which [Douglas-Home]… said is in conflict with Conservative Party policy.”13   
In a Birmingham Post article published on 24 September 1964, Griffiths argued 
that the: 
Labour Party was stirring up ‘a most dangerous political situation’ and if 
Socialist council returned to Smethwick in the next few years and gave 
homes to those who had only been in slum clearance properties a few 
months there would be immediate riots. 
 
In response, Gordon Walker went on to write to the Prime Minister, “I also ask that you 
disassociate yourself and your party from these remarks by Alderman Griffiths.”  In the 
Conservative Prime Minister response he stated, “I understand that Alderman Griffiths 
has stated that he finds himself in entire with what I said.  I do not, however, feel that a 
problem of this sort is dealt with by public correspondence during a General Election 
campaign.”  He contemplated closing the letter with the statement, “I am sure you will 
agree that it would be undesirable to risk making immigration a major national issue by 
continuing the correspondence.”14 
 The fact of the matter was that race and immigration had already surfaced on the 
national scene.  What Douglas-Home wanted to avoid was taking a clear stance on the 
events unfolding in Smethwick.  Furthermore, it was becoming evident that Griffiths may 
                                                 
13 PREM 11/ 4891, Patrick Gordon Walker to Alec Douglas-Home, 25 September 1964. 
14 PREM 11/ 4891,Alec Douglas-home ot Patrick Gordon Walker, 27 September 1964. 
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win the electoral bid, thus Conservative leaders chose to ignore the Candidates extreme 
positions in light of the fact that he was about to gain a seat held by Labour for the past 
twenty years. 
 Two years later, Peter Griffiths was unseated by a well-known actor, disappearing 
from political life until in 1979, he returned to Parliament representing Portsmouth North.  
Holding the seat until 1997, his carried out the rest of his political career with great 
caution, so much that the greater public did not realize he was the same “Peter Griffiths” 
from the 1964 Smethwick campaign.   
 Following the 1964 election, in a period when race relations was as the forefront 
of politics, Griffiths was not asked to become involved politically again.  Nonetheless, his 
campaign tactics had made it evident that playing the ‘race card’ could certainly equate to 
electoral success.  The events which unfolded from 1960 to 1964 in the small Midlands 
town constitute what Foot called a “milestone in British politics.”  Smethwick brought on 
the first Conservative organization in the country that dared associate itself unequivocally 
with anti-immigrant propaganda.  Prior to 1960, the mass of Conservative statements 
made in favor of multi-racialism had deterred such associations from doing so.  More 
importantly, by highlighting the electoral advantage of an anti-immigrant platform, 
Griffiths and his 1964 campaign provided the Conservative Party with a political formula 
to counter the electoral loyalty of the industrial working class to Labour. However limited 
and temporary his success, Griffiths, by way of his own working class origins and 
understanding that working class individuals were those most effected by immigration, 
helped develop the same resonance of loyalty as experienced by the Labour Party.  The 
issue was used to gain the necessary working class votes; in a sense, by facing the issue 
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straight on and taking a stance, the Smethwick Conservative accomplished what Labour 
set out to do by means of avoiding the issue.15   
Recognizing potential political payoff, the majority of Shadow Cabinet decided to 
move to the Right on the immigration issue.  On 3 February 1965, Alec Douglas-Home 
delivered a speech in which he called for tighter immigration control and evasion and a 
government scheme to assist immigrants to return to their countries of origin.16 Cyril 
Osborne went on to introduce a motion calling for a ban on all future immigration into 
Britain except for those whose parents or grandparents had been born in the country.  
Peter Thorneycroft MP, then Shadow Home Secretary, approached Cyril Osborne with 
the suggestion of a milder approach. The slightly toned-down motion – which still called 
for deportation and repatriation – was debated on 2 March 1965; the entire Shadow 
Cabinet marched into the same voting lobby in favor of ‘periodic and precise limits’ to 
immigration.17  
Thus, the ideas which would produce the 1971 Bill were shaped immediately 
following the Smethwick election.  Griffiths “had thrown a primed grenade into the 
parliamentary process” which would spark new debate; discussions previously avoided 
and viewed as political poison were now deliberated in the open arena.18  
On 21 May 1965, Enoch Powell, MP and staunch supporter of immigration 
control argued:  
The opportunity of a person to enter this country from the Commonwealth 
ought to be subject to exactly the same considerations, controls and 
conditions as the opportunity of a person coming from anywhere else… It 
is wholly absurd that while entry of aliens, whether from France or China, 
                                                 
15 Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, 77. 
16 Peter Evans, “Immigration: British-Style” Transition (1971): 43. 
17 Ibid., 42.. 
18 Clayton Goodwin “If you want a nigger for a neighbour vote Liberal or Labour” (2004): 41. 
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is controlled and policed with utmost efficiency, and permission to work, 
and even more to settle is granted only with the greatest care and 
circumspection, Commonwealth immigrants still stream in with little 
surveillance and an absolute right to bring or fetch an unlimited number of 
dependants.”19  
 
Nonetheless, the Conservative Party remained divided on the immigration issue.  
The inadequacy of the 1962 election had become evident, highlighted by the introduction 
of thirty one resolutions introduced at the 1965 Conservative Party calling for further 
restrictions and ‘precise limits.’20 Three years after the implementation of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, Conservatives were still plagued by the same pressures 
which motivated the move towards restriction in 1962.  
The Labour Party faced their own set of challenges.  Well aware if they adhered 
to a strong pro-immigrant policy they were certain to alienate the working class, yet 
fearful if they opted for further control they would lose the support of the socialist-
intellectual Left, Labour leaders realized the less they commented on the subject, the 
better, hoping that an attempt to remove the issue from the political agenda may result in 
less intense public opinion.  
The 1964 Wilson Administration was faced with two unattractive alternatives- 
they must either tighten controls or risk being perceived as acting irresponsibly by a 
significant section of the electorate.  Labour leaders were well aware that the Smethwick 
election made it quite evident that immigration could be a huge potential vote-loser if 
seen as permitting a flood of additional immigrants to enter British cities.21  
                                                 
19 Evans, “Immigration British-Style,” 43. 
20 I. Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities, (London: OPU, 1973) in Anthony Messina, Race and Party 
Competition in Britain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989): 36. 
21 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Volume I, 1964-1966 (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1975), 150. 
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The Government chose a two-pronged approach, attempting to strengthen the 
ineffective immigration controls enacted in 1962 while also moving to prevent 
discrimination against immigrants already residing in Britain.  Ultimately hoping to 
remove the immigration issue from the minds of the British public, Labour’s actions 
generated additional interest, as discussions of further limiting the entry of colored 
immigrants and the possible introduction of criminal sanctions against anyone charged 
with discriminating against a colored migrant made immigrant communities even more 
visible to the greater British public.22  
In response to the politicization of race at Smethwick, the parties worked in a 
bipartisan effort to extricate the issue from the political arena. Until 1975 leaders 
followed an informal rule in which each party avoided all race-related subjects.  
Whichever party was in control of government, they could expect the Opposition to 
cooperate in this area to an extent rarely enjoyed on other subjects. For over a decade, the 
Conservative and Labour parties joined in a truly bipartisan effort in terms of British race 
policy.  
 The cooperation between the two parties was made evident through the 
Conservative acceptance of the Race Relations Act of 1965, a hollow act outlawing 
discrimination in public places, and their agreement with the general outline of the White 
Paper proposing a reduction in the number of vouchers issued to Commonwealth 
Immigrants.  Alec Douglas-Home referred to the Labour initiatives as “sensible and very 
fair;”23 Norman St. John-Stevas, a Conservative Radical stated that both parties were in a 
“broad area of agreement on this [immigration] question… We are all agreed on the need 
                                                 
22 John Carson “A Matter of Policy: The Lessons or Recent British Race Relations Legislation” (1976): 
155. 
23 Katznelson, op. cit., 149 in Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, 38. 
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for control.”24 It was obvious that by the end of 1965 there was clear party agreement in 
the areas of race and immigration.  Both parties had agreed- keep race out of party 
politics- they did so simply by denying that such issues were politically relevant.25 
Before the Smethwick election of 1964, the Conservative and Labour parties 
attempted to keep the immigration issue out of public politics in order to secure their 
standing in the international arena.  After the hostile and openly racist campaign led by 
Griffiths, party leaders found it necessary to bury the issue once again. It was true that 
taking a clear stance could result in an electoral advantage, but in gaining the support of 
one faction, party leaders realized they would lose the votes of another, thus the parties 
chose to work together to keep the race issue out of politics all together in an effort to 
satisfy both ends of the electorate.  They wanted to decrease immigration while also 
appealing to the anti-discrimination lobby.  By extricating the issue from public politics, 
both governments were able to enact the necessary laws while avoiding the alienation of 
any certain part of the British public.  
 
24 Ibid. 
25 Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain, 38. 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Between 1945 and 1965, race and immigration in British politics had gone full 
circle.  The bipartisan effort to keep the immigration issue out of the public gaze 
immediately following the Second World War, launched in order to sustain Britain’s 
imperial status and portray the United Kingdom as a newly enlightened force, began to 
erode throughout the 1950s.  As the importance of Empire diminished and discussions of 
control increased, the issues of race and Commonwealth immigration formally confined 
to Members’ surgeries began to spill over into the public arena.  The 1958 incidents in 
Nottingham and Notting Hill, deemed ‘race riots’ by the press, contributed to public 
awareness, ultimately giving voice to political backbenchers who had opposed colored 
immigration from the start. 
By 1961, aware that could no longer keep pace with the American and Soviet 
superpowers thus less concerned with international opinion or Commonwealth 
preservation, the Conservative government found it an opportune time to introduce 
restrictive legislation.  While the Tories began to react to the strong lobby for 
immigration control, Labour remained opposed, resulting in a crack in the bipartisan 
effort established in the late 1940s.  But before long, consensus reemerged, as both 
parties wanted to avoid the issue from influencing electoral contests, though in an effort 
to appeal to the a wider section of the electorate, a centrist faction of the Labour party 
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emerged.  Intent on keeping the immigration out of public politics, both parties remained 
acutely aware of its significance, maneuvering in order to placate public opinion, but 
even more so, attempting to manipulate public opinion in order to forward their cause. 
The issue of colored immigration became a clear part of party politics in the 1964 
Smethwick election.  Not only did the Conservative candidate Peter Griffiths run an 
openly racist campaign, but he managed to win running on a clear anti-immigrant 
platform.  Both parties were aware of the political expediency the race issue may 
produce, but it was the Smethwick election that proved that the race and immigration 
issues could be major vote-getter.  While Conservative leaders did not issue official 
support for Griffiths and his tactics, they also failed to condemn his actions.  Party 
leaders may not have agreed with his tactics, but chose to turn a blind eye in order to 
capture the longstanding Labour seat. 
But just as Smethwick demonstrated the electoral advantage that may be gained 
by taking a strong stance against colored immigration, it was also clear that such a 
position would alienate the Socialist-intellectual section of the electorate.  Thus, in an 
attempt to avoid alienating either faction, both parties reentered their unofficial, unspoken 
bipartisan agreement to keep race and immigration out of party politics. 
While the colored immigration issue had been stifled after 1965 by the bipartisan 
agreement, the race issue would rear its ugly head again in 1968, when Enoch Powell 
resurfaced as the populist leader of the charge against non-white immigration.  He 
believed the entry of colored migrants into Britain posed a serious threat to British 
nationality and culture.  He argued that the arrival of a large number of colored 
immigrants and their tendency to congregate in concentrated areas in Britain would serve 
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as a barrier to assimilation resulting in a ‘race problem’ the equivalent of which had taken 
hold in the United States.  He went on to lobby for a complete halt to all immigration and 
the implementation of a plan to assist those black immigrants already settled in Britain in 
returning to their native countries.1   
Powell and his views were launched onto the national scene with his infamous 
‘river of blood’ speech delivered on 20 April 1968.  Opposing the pending Race 
Relations Bill, introduced two days later, he stated: 
For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the 
Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish.  Here is the 
means of showing that the immigrant communities can organize to 
consolidate their members to agitate and campaign against their fellow 
citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with legal weapons which 
the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided.  As I look ahead I am 
filled with foreboding.  Like the Roman, I see ‘the River Tiber foaming 
with much blood!’  That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we 
watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is 
interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, its coming 
upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect.2 
 
 Powell’s speech made him the most popular Conservative politician.  In four 
opinion polls he recorded an average approval rating of seventy-five percent.3 He 
received a flood of letters and enormous support at rallies and demonstrations, exhibiting 
the public frustration surrounding the bipartisan approach and dissatisfaction with anti-
discrimination legislation.  
The Labour government was enraged by Powell and his speech, believing the 
bipartisan agreement had been broken.  In order to disassociate the Conservative 
                                                 
1 Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration: Immigration, Race and Race Relations in Post-war 
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leadership from Powell’s views, he was removed from the Shadow Cabinet.  It was not 
the exact nature of his position that alienated Powell, but the fact that he expressed his 
opinions publicly.  After removing Powell, Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath 
stated: “I have repeatedly emphasized that the policy of the Conservative party is that 
immigration must be more stringently limited and that immigrants wishing to return to 
their own countries should be helped to financially do so.”4  Heath was angered at the 
fact that Powell broke the established rule of silences.  It became clear that Powell’s view 
represented the large segment of the population that clearly opposed New 
Commonwealth immigration, were angry over the decline of Britain’s imperial decline, 
and frustrated that British politicians, in their bipartisan effort to keep the issues out of 
the public eye, were, in fact, ignoring public interest.   
Although removed from the Shadow Cabinet, Powell still had a lasting effect on 
British politics.  As a result of his speech, eighty constituency resolutions on immigration 
were introduced at the annual Conservative conference.  With the amount of support 
Powell was receiving from within the Conservative party, combined with his 
overwhelming public popularity, the Heath administration was forced to announce 
tougher controls on immigration. 
Smethwick was the ‘political earthquake’ that injected race onto the political 
scene as, before the 1964 election, neither party could have guessed the extent to which it 
would galvanize the political scene. With Smethwick the issue received a high political 
profile from which it was difficult to retreat.  The response of both parties was to attempt 
to depoliticize race, a bipartisan effort that proved both self-serving and angering the 
                                                 
4 Quoted in Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Politics and Migrations in the United States, 1900-30 
and Great Britain, 1948-1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 181. 
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electorate and party activists long-term. Nonetheless, Conservative and Labour leaders 
had managed to create dilute the issue for a period of time, ultimately ensuring the 
campaign tactics used at Smethwick would not resurface.  With the exception of Enoch 
Powell, both parties managed to impose the bipartisan agreement and marginalize the 
issues of race and immigration for over a decade.5 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Anthony Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989): 51. 
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